Business in the Balkans: the case for cross-border cooperation by David-Barrett, Liz
Centre for European Reform
29 Tufton Street 
London SW1P 3QL UK
T: 00 44 20 7233 1199 
F: 00 44 20 7233 1117
www.cer.org.uk
info@cer.org.uk
July 2002
ISBN 1 901 229 32 7 ★ £5/S8
Business
in the
Balkans:
The case for cross-border
co-operation
Liz Barrett 
July 2002
Business
in the Balkans:
The case for cross-border
co-operation
Liz Barrett 
ABOUT THE AUTHOR
Liz Barrett is currently based at St Antony’s College, Oxford,
researching political corruption in Eastern Europe. In 2000 and
2001, she worked as a freelance journalist in the Balkans, based in
Zagreb and writing for The Economist and Business Central
Europe, among other publications.  
AUTHOR’S ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
The author would like to thank all those who shared their views
and expertise during interviews undertaken for this report.
Valuable contributions were made by the CER team and by friends
and colleagues in the region, including Biljana Dakic´, Tamás Dávid,
Ivo Prokopiev and Sinan Ülgen. Thanks are also owed to members
of the TRANSFUSE Association, whose hard work has convinced
me that cross-border co-operation in the Balkans is both possible
and fruitful. The conclusions and any errors are the author’s own.
★
Foreword
The Centre for European Reform would like to thank the Richard C. Welden
Foundation and Raiffeisenbank Austria Zagreb for supporting this publication.
RICHARD C. WELDEN FOUNDATION
The Richard C. Welden Foundation is a private non-profit organisaton based in
New York. The Foundation sponsors studies on EU integration and on
reconciliation between Turkey and Greece, and between the Catholic and the
Orthodox Churches. The Foundation also gives scholarships for the education
of Balkan students in the EU and US. This year, the Foundation launched an
international competition on EU-US Relations: ‘The US and the EU:
Transatlantic Drift or Common Destiny’. For further details, please see
www.welden.org.
Raiffeisenbank Austria Zagreb is a member of the RZB Group, winner of The
Banker’s ‘Bank of the Year 2001’. As part of its long-term business strategy in
Central and Eastern Europe, Raiffeisenbank Austria has been active in Croatia
for seven years. RBA Zagreb has won numerous Croatian and foreign awards,
including prestigious ones from Euromoney and Central European, and the
Zlatna kuna Award of the Croatian Chamber of Commerce for the best bank
in Croatia in 2000.
★
Contents
About the author
Author’s acknowledgements
I Introduction 1
II Creating a single market 5
III Promoting Balkan investment 19
IV Seamless infrastructure 27
V Conclusion and recommendations 37
I Introduction
Stability is the pre-condition for success in Central and Eastern
Europe. As the region emerged from communism in the 1990s, the
leaders of some countries quickly convinced the world that they
offered safe havens for investment and were reliable business
partners. Those countries won political friends, reaped economic
beneﬁts and are now preparing to join the EU. Other leaders instead
earned themselves a bad name for promoting an aggressive
nationalism. Their countries, and those in the neighbourhood, sank
into conﬂict, political instability and economic decline. This was the
fate of most of the Balkans.1
A new generation of governments is now in place in the Balkans,
elected by voters keen to see living standards improve and to join the
European Union. To achieve these goals, the Balkan countries need
stability. The catch is that the best guarantee of stability is improved
relations between countries which were until very recently enemies.
Few politicians in the region are willing to risk public disapproval by
rebuilding relationships with neighbouring countries.
This paper argues that the way to achieve stability in the Balkans is
to promote links among the business communities. Improved cross-
border business links will help to bring rapid economic gains
through higher levels of entrepreneurial activity and increased
foreign investment. If business leads, politicians will ﬁnd it
acceptable to follow.  
1 For the purposes of this paper, the ‘Balkans’ refer to: Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Bulgaria, Croatia, the Republic of Macedonia, Romania and Yugoslavia (Serbia and
Montenegro). This paper was drafted before Yugoslavia’s change of name, so refer-
ences are to ‘Yugoslavia’, rather than ‘Serbia and Montenegro’. Bulgaria and
Romania are applicants for EU membership.
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The Balkans
Political leaders in the Balkans are used to the idea that their countries
are interdependent, but they tend to be suspicious of political
integration. Some even see their linkages with neighbouring countries
as a burden that cannot be escaped. In recent years, Bulgarian and
Romanian companies have suffered frequent disruptions to their
export routes through Yugoslavia. Foreign investors steered clear of
Macedonia and Albania as the Kosovo crisis developed. Holiday-
makers deserted Croatian resorts during the Bosnian and Croatian
wars and have only recently begun to return. And Bosnian companies
are still struggling to regain business with Hungary and Croatia that
was lost when war destroyed crucial rail links.
This paper focuses on the positive aspects of economic
interdependence. It argues that Balkan countries can accelerate
their own economic development by exploiting the potential for
cross-border trading. And it seeks to offer a strategy for regional
integration that is politically and economically realistic and does
not compromise more ambitious future aims, such as EU accession.
In addition to promoting economic development, regional co-
operation could bring direct beneﬁts for Balkan stability and
security. The experience of the EU suggests that economic
integration can help to promote security. Co-operation among a
handful of national coal and steel industries in Western Europe half
a century ago laid the foundations not just for economic prosperity,
but also for improved political relations among participating states. 
The Balkan countries do not function as a single market at present,
however, and the barriers to doing business – especially across
borders – are enormous. These barriers deter foreign investment
and make it difﬁcult for local ﬁrms to co-operate with ﬁrms in
neighbouring countries. This paper highlights the existing obstacles
to business across borders and identiﬁes steps that need to be taken
to overcome them. 
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The ﬁrst chapter argues that trade liberalisation and improved
customs efﬁciency are essential to make trade within the region free
and easy, rather than slow and costly. The paper discusses several
options for liberalising trade, taking into account political
feasibility and the likely impact on national economies. 
The second chapter identiﬁes ways of encouraging both foreign
companies and local entrepreneurs to invest in the Balkans.
Greenﬁeld investment, in particular, brings concrete economic
beneﬁts: foreign capital and know-how from committed long-term
investors. But greenﬁeld investment is in short supply in the
Balkans, where privatisation has shaped the investment
environment, frequently attracting second-rate foreign investors
that are unwilling or unable to overhaul a company. This section
suggests that a Balkan-wide investment promotion campaign could
re-package the region as an exciting emerging market with high
growth potential. This campaign should use the experience of
foreign investors in the Balkans to date, identifying what attracted
them to the region when others shied away. 
The small business sector also has great potential, but its growth is
stunted by the lack of ﬁnancing options. Chapter two suggests that
chambers of commerce in the region could connect local
entrepreneurs with foreign investors, to facilitate the formation of
joint ventures. It also argues that the countries themselves could set
up a regional structure for ﬁnancing, in the form of a Balkan
Development Bank, devoted to cross-border projects and run by
bankers from the region. 
The third chapter focuses on the infrastructure and services which
sustain businesses in the region – transport, energy, telecoms and
banking. It argues that infrastructure development must support
the regionalising trend in business activity. Foreign investors have
recognised this fact and are seeking to develop new regional services
to meet the demand, for example, for banking. However, most
infrastructure industries tend to be in state ownership, so
II Creating a single market
It takes one week to transport goods from Thessaloniki in northern
Greece to Ljubljana, the capital of Slovenia, says Samo Ivanc˘ic´,
president of the American Chamber of Commerce in Slovenia – a
journey that should take no more than two and a half days. The
truck crosses four borders, encountering different trade regimes,
currencies and a host of inefﬁcient or corrupt customs ofﬁcials. It is
not only trade that is problematic. When Ivanc˘ic´ travels around the
region, he has to deal with an array of complicated visa
requirements. “Commuting in the Balkans is a nightmare”, he says.
“The problem didn’t exist ten years ago and I sincerely hope it will
be better in ten years’ time”.
Ivanc˘ic´’s story is all too familiar to business-people operating in the
region. Put simply, the Balkans does not function as a single market.
But it could if governments liberalised trade faster and more
thoroughly, and improved the efﬁciency of customs services. 
Facilitating trade
If the Balkans region is to achieve sustainable – rather than aid-
dependent – growth, it will have to ﬁnd a way for goods to ﬂow
freely and cheaply across borders. Over the past ten years, political
instability and security problems have blocked normal business
development, leaving economies reliant on inﬂows of foreign aid.
With these risks now subsiding, the Balkans has to focus on
rebuilding solid economic foundations so that it can start catching
up with the more advanced transition countries. 
Catch-up will depend largely on investment. The Balkan
economies are unhealthily dominated by labour-intensive sectors
like agriculture and mining. Shifting the balance towards skilled
manufacturing and services will require signiﬁcant levels of
governments need to think regionally too. Privatisation remains the
priority, but governments should consider the potential for regional
connections when restructuring and preparing ﬁrms for sale. The
aim is to ensure that these services operate smoothly and to increase
pressure for reform. The liberalisation of such industries is still
politically controversial in the region. 
The paper addresses its recommendations to three groups: national
governments, business people and international organisations. Its
purpose is not to analyse the strategies of international organisations
like the European Union or the World Bank, or regional ones like the
Stability Pact,2 but to consider how the development of the private
sector might promote political and economic integration. The
research has been conducted using a bottom-up approach, focusing
on the experiences of business people, whether foreign investors or
locals, who currently operate in the Balkans. It attempts to draw a
clear picture of how business across borders works, or does not
work, and how it could be stimulated. 
Similarly, the paper argues that business people, not politicians or
foreign administrators, should take the lead in promoting economic
co-operation. Where two ﬁrms see an economic reason to work
together, they should be helped to do so. Policy-makers can
facilitate this by improving the framework in which business
functions – for example, by harmonising legislation or improving
infrastructure. However, the impetus to change the framework
should come from business. Where companies see no beneﬁt in co-
operation, politicians and international policy-makers should not
force the issue. 
4 Business in the Balkans
2 The Stability Pact for South-East Europe was set up in June 1999 by the EU, other
G-8 members, the Balkan states and their neighbours, and international organisa-
tions in the area. It is dedicated to achieving political and economic stability in the
region, and to fostering respect for democracy and human rights.
corruption and crippling delays. In some cases, these costs merely
push up prices; they deter other investors altogether. 
Every step towards the creation of a single and efﬁcient trading
zone would boost the Balkan region’s appeal to foreign investors.
Individual countries would be able to market themselves as part of
a large, fast-growing region, instead of appearing to be small
countries with difﬁcult neighbours. And foreign investors would be
able to treat the region more like a single market. 
★ Local businesses. The Balkans cannot rely solely on foreign
investment, and no government in the region would want to. But
most local companies are in a mess. They have been hit hard by the
difﬁcult operating conditions of the past decade – most have
outdated equipment, high debts and low productivity. For the
moment, these ﬁrms have no hope of exporting to the EU. A more
realistic and constructive strategy would be to boost trade with
neighbouring countries.
Increasing exports to the EU is undoubtedly important in the longer
term, and essential to improving competitiveness in preparation for
EU entry. But the Balkan states have achieved little so far: exports
to the EU have only risen over the last decade in sectors such as
textiles, metals and mining, where competitiveness is based on
cheap labour or natural resources. Very few Balkan companies have
been able to compete in EU markets for higher value-added
products; most are simply too weak ﬁnancially to invest in
upgrading production to meet EU standards. For consumer
products, in particular, the cost of an extensive advertising
campaign, necessary to achieve brand recognition in the EU’s
mature markets, is prohibitively high. 
Many governments have exacerbated the problem by failing to
push through the structural reforms – privatisation, bank reform
and so on – which are a precondition for building competitive
industries and re-orientating trade. In the worst cases, politicians
foreign investment and sufﬁcient local economic activity to
stimulate domestic investment. Both foreign and local
investment will benefit from trade liberalisation, so that
companies can take advantage of the larger regional market, not
just local opportunities.
★ Foreign investors. The Balkan countries, individually, are
simply too small to attract many foreign companies. Only
Romania, with a population of 23 million, is a sizeable market.
Bulgaria and Yugoslavia have less than 10 million people each;
and the remaining countries in the region each have a population
of under 5 million. Taken altogether, however, the region
represents a market of around 55 million, rising to 130 million if
Greece and Turkey are included. Markets in Ukraine, Armenia,
Georgia and Azerbaijan also loom on the horizons of business
people in Bulgaria and Turkey.
Many foreign companies already operating in the region have
adopted a Balkan-wide strategy, setting up headquarters in one
country, while selling to and importing from others in the region.
French car manufacturer Renault, for example, which bought
Romania’s Dacia car plant in 1999, aims to produce 200,000 cars
a year by 2010, selling them throughout the region. Some ﬁrms
produce in several countries, their suppliers and producers trading
with each other across borders. Greek dairy firm Delta has
factories in Romania, Bulgaria and Serbia, with each plant
supplying neighbouring countries too. Russian oil giant Lukoil,
which owns the Neftochim refinery in Bulgaria, is creating a
network of petrol stations across Yugoslavia, Macedonia, Greece
and Turkey, and it hopes to buy oil companies in Croatia,
Hungary, Romania and Greece. 
At present, though, investors cannot treat these countries as a single
market in any real sense, because the cost of cross-border business
is too high. At an average border in the region, trade in goods is
likely to encounter not only high customs tariffs, but pervasive
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Some companies could increase cross-border trade considerably by
resurrecting old trading relationships severed by war. Grasping
these business opportunities does not require massive investment in
product upgrades or marketing. Indeed, many products already
beneﬁt from brand recognition in other countries of the region,
especially within the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Serbs, for
example, were happy to see familiar brands from Croatian food
ﬁrms Podravka and Kras˘ back on their shelves in 2001. Not all of
the old former Yugoslav trading relationships should be resurrected
– some only ever existed because of subsidies. But there is certainly
money to be made in pursuing deals with neighbours. And that
money could enable struggling Balkan ﬁrms to start investing in
improving productivity and standards. 
This is as much a question of political will as of corporate strategy.
Current trading patterns in the region suggest that companies
quickly exploit opportunities once costs are reduced. Countries
which have reached bilateral free-trade agreements with their
neighbours enjoy far higher trading levels than those which
continue to impose heavy import duties. To some extent, that is
because free-trade agreements are negotiated when trading
relationships are good. But the agreement itself can play a crucial
role. When the free-trade agreement between Croatia and Bosnia
broke down in 1999, following a dispute over terms, Croatia’s
exports to Bosnia, until then its third largest export partner,
dropped by around a quarter over the following 12 months. 
The Macedonian example is also interesting. Macedonia has
concluded free-trade deals with Albania, Bosnia, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Slovenia, Turkey and Yugoslavia – by far the most of any Balkan
country. Now it is negotiating with Romania. Macedonia’s trade
with the region was, of course, disrupted in 2001 by conﬂict. But in
1998 it had the highest proportion of trade with South-East
European countries of all countries in the region, despite the fact
that it is producing similar goods to its neighbours. 
have seen privatisation as a way of lining their own pockets, rather
than as a means of improving a company’s productivity. Even where
governments have the best intentions, they are often too weak to
push through difﬁcult reforms. They lack know-how and are
vulnerable to pressures from workers’ unions. 
Therefore, while exporting to the EU must remain a key long-term
goal for Balkan companies, it is not necessarily the best place for
them to start. Expanding trade within the Balkans, on the other
hand, can be a proﬁtable – interim strategy. Balkan economists
tend to dismiss the importance of intra-regional trade, arguing
that neighbouring countries are too poor to be of interest, and
that they are economic competitors, producing similar goods.
They cite as evidence the current levels of intra-regional trade,
which the World Bank has estimated at just 12 to 14 per cent of
total exports and imports, on average.3
Look at the ﬁgures in detail, however, and it is clear that intra-
regional trade is important for particular countries and sectors.
Bosnia, for example, conducts well over a quarter of its trade with
Croatia, and Macedonia relies heavily on Yugoslavia for its
exports. Bosnia, Slovenia, Yugoslavia and Greece are among
Croatia’s top ten export destinations; Turkey, Yugoslavia and
Greece are in Bulgaria’s top ﬁve, together taking more than 25 per
cent of that country’s exports.4
There are also many business opportunities that have yet to be
exploited. Serbia, for example, could provide sheet steel for
Bulgarian refrigerators, and Croatia components for Bosnian car-
assembly plants. Yugoslav ﬁrms are keen to enter the Bosnian
market for agricultural equipment, and planting and seed material,
as well as coal and other mining products. In some cases, co-
operation could make the difference between production being
viable or not.
8 Business in the Balkans Creating a single market 9
3 World Bank, The road to stability and prosperity in South-Eastern Europe, 2000.
4 2000 trade ﬁgures. 
How best to liberalise trade?
The current trend in the region is to follow Macedonia’s example
by negotiating an increasing number of bilateral free-trade
agreements with neighbours. The current network of agreements
looks like this:
Bilateral free-trade agreements in South-Eastern Europe
Y= has agreement; NEG = in negotiations; * Both CEFTA members5
Where free-trade agreements do not exist, the costs of doing business
across borders increase signiﬁcantly, sometimes prohibitively.
Croatia’s Podravka might beneﬁt from brand familiarity in
Yugoslavia, but it has had to face tariffs of 40 per cent or so levied at
Yugoslav borders. Podravka is considering producing in Macedonia
to exploit the country’s free-trade arrangements. That makes sense
for Podravka, which can be reasonably certain about its market
potential. For other companies, these extra costs may deter them
from entering the market altogether. 
Governments in the region have started to talk about negotiating
free-trade agreements as a priority. But when it comes to cutting
duties, many are reluctant to for go a major source of state revenue.
The Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub Labus, for example,
has commented that it would be difﬁcult for Yugoslavia to reduce
average tariffs below 9 per cent. The Yugoslav government faces
difﬁculties trying to raise revenue from other sources because
corporate proﬁts and income levels are so low. In some Balkan
countries, customs revenue represents as much as 3 per cent of
GDP. Nevertheless, given the relatively low levels of intra-regional
trade (as a proportion of total trade), the revenue losses from
liberalisation would be small. More importantly, liberalising trade
would bring economic beneﬁts that, in the medium term, clearly
outweigh losses to the budget. 
10 Business in the Balkans 11
5 CEFTA is the Central European Free Trade Agreement, comprising Bulgaria,
Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia.
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EU’s membership criteria and what help they need in
implementation. The agreements represent a mutual
commitment. The candidate agrees to implement reforms and
harmonise legislation; the EU agrees to assist the country in
making the necessary adjustments.
The new approach focuses heavily on removing barriers to trade
with the EU. In time, the argument goes, all of the countries of the
Western Balkans will effectively become part of the EU single
market. But progress towards this goal is likely to be slow.
Negotiations have already highlighted the varied levels of
development among the Western Balkan countries. Croatia and
Macedonia have signed their agreements and are busy with
implementation and harmonisation. Albania stumbled at the ﬁrst
hurdle when an EU Feasibility Report said the country lacked a
sound basis from which to start negotiations. However, after more
thorough preparations, talks look set to start in 2002. Bosnia has
not even reached the Feasibility Report stage. It is still trying to
complete the 18 pre-conditions set by the EU, which include such
basics as the passage of an electoral law, and it is behind schedule
on those. Yugoslavia, too, is a long way from signing its
Stabilisation and Association Agreement. And while it might be
feasible to expect all of the countries to have concluded agreements
within ﬁve years, full implementation – will take much longer.
South-Eastern Europe needs to liberalise trade within the region at
a much faster pace than that. 
Numerous Balkan observers have advocated a genuine free-trade zone
for South-Eastern Europe, embracing all of the countries. The Centre
for European Policy Studies, a Brussels think-tank, put forward the
idea in 1999.6 In September 2001, German Foreign Minister Joschka
Fischer revived the concept, advocating a limited economic union for
the Western Balkans, based on the model of the European Economic
Area – a single market among European states, including some which
are not members of the EU. In theory, Fischer’s idea is a good one. A
free-trade zone would overcome the problem of complexity: goods
In June 2001, Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia,
Macedonia, Romania and Yugoslavia decided to speed up the
process. Under the auspices of the Stability Pact, they signed a
memorandum to create bilateral free-trade networks with all other
countries in the region by the end of 2002. That would allow at
least 90 per cent of goods to be exchanged tariff-free. 
This is an admirable undertaking and one that is making steady
progress, but the bilateral approach has its disadvantages. This
network of bilateral free-trade agreements will not result in a free-
trade zone, but in a tangled web of different trade regimes. Most
agreements do not liberalise trade fully, but stipulate exemptions on
certain products for certain time periods. Macedonia’s agreement
with Croatia, for example, looks different to the one it has with
Slovenia. And although all three countries have free-trade
agreements with each other, they do not represent a mini free-trade
zone. Macedonian products still face different treatment on
Croatian and Slovenian borders, leaving considerable scope for
delays, confusion and corruption. If the aim of trade liberalisation
is to reduce complexity, a system of bilateral agreements fails.
Foreign investors, seeking to establish a single country export base
in the region, will ﬁnd this web of bilateral agreements a continuing
deterrent to cross-border trade.
The EU argues that this problem will be solved through its own
bilateral negotiations in the region, as part of the Stabilisation
and Association Process. Established after NATO’s bombing of
Serbia and Kosovo in 1999, the process is intended to give Balkan
countries a clear prospect of joining the EU. Prior to its launch,
only Bulgaria and Romania were considered accession
candidates, having signed Europe Agreements in the early 1990s,
along with the Central European countries. The Stabilisation and
Association Agreements were designed specifically for the
countries of the Western Balkans (Albania, Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Croatia, Macedonia and Yugoslavia). The aim is to assess what
reforms these countries need to undertake in order to meet the
12 Business in the Balkans Creating a single market 13
6 Michael Emerson, A system for post-war South-Eastern Europe, CEPS, 1999.
association. Its members are not prevented from joining the EU but
can beneﬁt from free trade with neighbours in the meantime.
CEFTA’s impact on non-agricultural trade has been signiﬁcant.
Trade between the Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland has
grown almost 50 per cent in the past four years alone (see chart).8
The CEFTA option would have three advantages for the Balkans:
★ it would overcome the political sensitivities which surround the
issue of increased regional co-operation by de facto creating a
Balkan free-trade zone; 
★ it would encompass more countries than a purely Balkan club
and lead to a closer relationship to the EU, aiding the Balkan
countries’ progress towards EU membership; and
★ it should be faster to achieve than Stabilisation and Association
Agreements for each Balkan country. 
The EU could help by encouraging CEFTA’s existing members to
admit the entire region of the Western Balkans. Croatia’s
application to join CEFTA was stalled for several years, although it
would be able to move around the region freely and the system would
be simple and transparent. There would be fewer delays at borders
and the scope for corruption would be reduced. 
In practice, however, negotiating such an agreement would be
impossible. There is very little government support for the regional
free-trade idea, largely for political reasons. If the Balkan countries
share anything, it is a fear of being stuck in a group with one
another. This is a hot political issue. Croatians and Slovenians, in
particular, tend to see regional associations as plots to recreate the
former Yugoslavia. Croatia’s Foreign Minister, Tonino Picula, for
example, described Fischer’s suggestion of a Western Balkans
Economic Union as “isolation from the basic process that leads to
the EU”. Given the difﬁculties, it could take several years at best to
conclude such a deal.  By then, if things go well, the countries will
be focusing on free-trade with Central Europe and Western Europe,
and a South-East European zone will be outdated.
Looking to the future, the most effective and realistic way of
introducing free trade might be to incorporate the countries in a
broader arrangement. Membership of the WTO represents a start,
and Albania, Bulgaria, Croatia, Romania, Slovenia and Turkey
are  already members. But the best option might be for all the
Balkan countries to join the Central European Free Trade
Agreement (CEFTA).7
Founded in 1993, as a way to ensure that greater integration with
the EU did not jeopardise intra-regional trade, CEFTA now has
seven members, including Bulgaria and Romania. Through a
comprehensive set of bilateral agreements, CEFTA has succeeded
in liberalising trade in industrial products almost completely.
Initially, there was little enthusiasm for CEFTA, for many of the
same reasons that a Balkan free-trade zone is rejected.
Governments viewed CEFTA as a diversion from EU integration
and pointless, given similarly structured economies with little
intra-regional trade. Yet CEFTA has emerged as an important
14 Business in the Balkans Creating a single market 15
7 See Stanislav Daskalov and Nicky Mladenov, A comprehensive trade policy plan
for the Western Balkans, European Institute, Bulgaria, September 2000.
8 Source: Budapest Economics.
The project is also creating a website to give traders access to
information on all of the customs regimes in the region. A
certiﬁed training scheme is being offered to freight-forwarding
companies, teaching drivers how best to prepare the
paperwork required at borders. At present, the project is
operating as a pilot on only a few border crossings, but the
idea is to translate the lessons into national policy. 
★ The South-East Europe Cooperative Initiative (SECI), a forum
for regional decision-makers, is examining ways to improve
border crossings in 13 countries. SECI’s major contribution has
been to bring together customs ofﬁcials and private-sector
companies to discuss the difﬁculties of using borders. The
expertise gathered at these sessions is passed onto national
policy-makers, as well as internationally funded programmes
such as the World Bank’s project.
Further steps are needed to complement these initiatives. Business
associations and chambers of commerce could help by educating
and informing their members about different border regulations,
and channelling complaints about practice on the ground to
policy-makers. Countries could also eliminate wasteful delays by
relaxing visa procedures for drivers with good track records. EU
members are an offender, requiring Balkan freight-shipping
companies to renew their visas, even multiple-entry ones, every
three months, thereby leading to the loss of one or two working
days. The Stability Pact’s Business Advisory Council, similar to the
SECI forum but with greater foreign-investor representation, could
play an important lobbying role here.
is now set to join in 2002, as it needed ﬁrst to meet two pre-
conditions for membership – a signed EU Association Agreement
and WTO membership. These pre-conditions should be realxed.
But more generally, the current members may be opposed to
broadening their club. However, the majority of current CEFTA
members will be leaving the organisation within the next few years,
following EU enlargement. 
The customs problem: borders or barricades?
The World Bank has documented the delays experienced at border
crossings in Eastern Europe. It found average waiting times at
border crossings of ﬁve hours between Macedonia and Yugoslavia;
36 hours in total at borders between Bulgaria and Germany; and 24
hours from Albania to its Adriatic neighbour, Italy. Add to this
transit times through the countries, on poor road and rail networks,
and exporting within or from the region begins to look pretty costly.
Trade in perishable goods is in many cases impossible.
Many customs ofﬁcials offer a speedier service for those who are
willing to pay. This pervasive corruption is encouraged by the
complexity of the customs regimes, since few drivers know the
individual laws well enough to challenge ofﬁcials. Even where
corruption is not an issue, outdated technology and poorly trained
personnel create border delays. Free-trade under such conditions is
a ﬁction – regardless of the agreements signed by governments.
Two initiatives are currently focusing on these problems:
★ The World Bank is running a scheme in six countries, aimed at
helping them improve customs procedures on their borders,
called the ‘Trade and Transport Facilitation in South-East
Europe Project’. Improvements may be as simple as
introducing a single point of payment, with an itemised bill,
for various customs charges; or allowing selective checking –
many countries currently require every vehicle to be opened.
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III Promoting Balkan investment
South-Eastern Europe is not an economic black hole. Intrepid
foreign investors do venture into the region, and many return to
invest again. Despite repeated bouts of instability, Balkan
economies have continued to function and the foreign investment
stock has risen steadily, amounting to 14.5 per cent of regional
GDP by the end of 1999. Given the risks, this compares relatively
well with foreign investment levels in Central Europe (the Czech
Republic, Hungary, Slovakia, Slovenia and Poland), at 23.8 per cent
of GDP.9 The democratic elections in Yugoslavia in 2000 have
further reduced the perceived risks of investing in the region. The
Economist Intelligence Unit is forecasting that the ﬂow of foreign
investment into the region, as a percentage of GDP, is likely to
overtake that to Central Europe from 2002.10
That is good news for the Balkans. The region desperately needs
capital and foreign business know-how. But the beneﬁts of foreign
investment depend as much on the type of investment as the quantity.
Most of the foreign investment to date in the Balkans has been related
to privatisation, and the expected increase in investment over the next
few years is largely due to a pick-up in the pace of such sales.
Privatisation is an essential part of transition, but governments should
not rely on it to bring in beneﬁcial foreign investment. In the Balkans,
privatisation has often been an opaque – if not outright corrupt –
process. Ofﬁcials frequently fail to select the most appropriate
investor. And, since sales are rarely accompanied by liberalisation or
effective regulation, they tend not to increase competition. 
Privatisation programmes can certainly be improved, but the region
needs to attract investment in greenﬁeld sites, and mergers and
9 Jared Manasek, Back to business in the Balkans, Economist Intelligence Unit, 2000.
10 Economist Intelligence Unit, Economies in transition, March 2001.
countries closer to the Balkans had a more realistic picture of
where it was possible to do business and where not. The whole
environment was more familiar to them. They had historical
links – the Habsburg Empire once stretched into today’s
Croatia, Bosnia and Serbia, while Turks occupied much of the
area for hundreds of years. History fosters cultural links that
facilitate contacts and even trust between business people: 
“An environment which might seem impossible to a
Luxembourg company is business as usual to us,” says Muhtar
Kent, president of Turkish brewery Efes. “Turkish companies
are used to coping with ever-changing rules or long waits for
payments”, says Faruk Erkoç, president of Penta, a Turkish
trade and distribution company specialising in oil products.
Their experience is not all positive, however. Some Turkish
investors say the Balkan business environment is less stable
and predictable than that in Central Asia. 
★Easy to penetrate. The lack of competition within Balkan markets
makes it relatively easy for new entrants to gain a foothold. The
marketing costs required to achieve a signiﬁcant market share in
the Balkans are a fraction of those needed to penetrate a more
mature and crowded market. Thus, doing business in the Balkans
is in a sense easier, for some companies, than doing business in
Western Europe. For some companies, brand familiarity can also
reduce marketing costs in Balkan markets. 
★ EU prospects. South-Eastern Europe’s proximity to Western
Europe and, in particular, its prospects for entry into the EU are
key attractions. This helps Turkish and Greek companies decide
to invest in the Balkans instead of the Caucasus, and convinces
Austrian investors that an investment in a country like Croatia
will complement their Central European strategies. Even if
membership itself cannot be expected for many years, the fact
that these countries are engaged with the EU and could soon be
bound into accession preparations sends an important signal. 
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acquisition too. The beneﬁts are clear: foreign investors setting up
new businesses bring in foreign know-how and capital and show a
high degree of commitment. It is far more difﬁcult for a country to
attract greenﬁeld rather than privatisation investment. Greenﬁeld
investors are more easily deterred by the risk of political or ethnic
problems in a country or its neighbours. They need to be convinced
that the Balkans is a safe and proﬁtable place to invest; and they
need easy access to information about doing business in the region.
At present, the Balkans fails on all accounts – at least in public
perception. This author recommends a Balkan-wide investment
promotion campaign, to be administered either by a regional
investment agency, or by a co-operative task-force formed by
national investment agencies.
Time for a new image
South-Eastern Europe is in serious need of a good promotion
campaign to reverse the negative associations of recent conﬂicts.
Yugoslav Foreign Minister Goran Svilanovic´ has suggested, tongue-
in-cheek, that the theme of such a campaign might be “nice people
live in the Balkans”. Yugoslav Deputy Prime Minister Miroljub
Labus implored a business forum in Thessaloniki in 2001: “Come
to my country – if you want to do business, you will ﬁnd friendly
and able counterparts.” Both ministers recognise that it is essential
to restore foreign investor conﬁdence in the Balkans.
The campaign should highlight the region’s potential for high
returns that are no longer attainable in the more mature markets of
Western and Central Europe. It should also focus on the experience
of foreign investors already operating in the region. Most are from
four countries: Greece, Turkey, Austria and Italy. Investors from
each of these countries tend to have varying patterns of interest, but
they share certain characteristics and views about why investing in
the Balkans is worthwhile:
★ Not as explosive as it looks. Investors from Northern Europe
or the United States were deterred from the whole Balkan
region by television images of ﬁghting in one part. Those from
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agencies and non-government organisations around the region and
contains useful information about the legal framework for
investment in individual countries. 
However, the process of information-gathering would be much
easier if there were a one-stop-shop for the region – a regional
investment agency. Investors need to assess overall regional
conditions before setting up a greenﬁeld production site.
Comparing different locations is one aspect, but they also need to
know how easy it is to export within the region. If costs are pushed
up by poor infrastructure, customs tariffs, corruption or border
delays, the investment may not be viable. Encouragement, and
ﬁnancial assistance from the World Bank or EU, would help
investment agencies overcome their distaste for co-operation. And
the campaign would probably get backing from banks with
regional branch networks, which have a clear interest in
encouraging cross-border investment.
If investment agencies start to co-operate, a natural spin-off could
be the establishment of cross-border incentive programmes. Most
countries in the region already offer investment incentives in the
form of tax exemptions on reinvested proﬁts, imported inputs and
investment in certain regions. Given the beneﬁts of region-wide
projects, governments could be encouraged to offer joint incentive
programmes for such investments. 
The role of small businesses
Foreign investment might be the engine of economies in transition,
but the long-term prosperity of these countries will require the
development of a strong small and medium-sized business sector.
Balkan entrepreneurs have superior knowledge of the local
operating environment and many ideas for promising business
ventures. But they have virtually no access to ﬁnance: venture
capitalists tend to back foreign investors, and banks are unwilling to
lend to start-ups. 
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★ Cheap, skilled labour. The Balkans has cheap but skilled
labour. That makes it a good location for producing export
goods. To date, most of the export-oriented investment in
assembly and production plants has gone to the more
advanced transition countries, like Hungary or the Czech
Republic. But as these countries attract more and more high
value-added investments, investors will start focusing on the
skilled labour base in the Balkans for low value-added
production. Asia may still be cheaper, but in the Balkans, the
labour force has, by and large, received a broad, high-quality
education. The Balkans can also market its particular labour
force strengths in areas such as languages and technology.
Bulgaria, for example, has earned a strong reputation for
having good mathematicians and computer scientists, making
it a magnet for IT investment.
Promoting the region
If inward investment agencies are to promote a region rather than
separate countries, they need to ﬁnd new ways of co-operating.
Currently they compete to attract foreign investment. That is
inevitable and healthy, but competition should be accompanied by
co-operative efforts to persuade investors of the beneﬁts of their
region over, say, Central Europe. Bringing foreign investment to the
region as a whole is in each individual country’s national interests.
Serbia would gain from the establishment of a new plant in Bulgaria
with plans to export to the west through Serbian territory; it might
gain less than if the plant were in Serbia itself, but far more than if
the investor chose to locate the factory in Hungary. 
Bulgaria’s foreign investment agency has already recognised that
investors seek access to the regional market. In October 2000, it
launched the ﬁrst Investment Guide for South-Eastern Europe at
the South-East Europe Forum, a conference on regional investment
held in Soﬁa and attended by more than 2,000 business people. The
Guide was compiled from contributions sent in by investment
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11 The members of Black Sea Trade and Development Bank are Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Bulgaria, Georgia, Greece, Moldova, Romania, Russia, Turkey and
Ukraine.
One way around the problem is for local entrepreneurs to join
forces with foreign investors. This has been the pattern followed by
numerous Turkish ﬁrms in the Balkans. In contrast to Greek state-
owned companies, like OTE and the National Bank of Greece,
which have invested hundreds of millions of dollars in the Balkan
banking sector, Turkish investors have tended to be small, private
players. Until recently, they were excluded from most EU funding
schemes, which prevented them from competing for major
infrastructure or reconstruction projects. As a result, Turkish
companies are prominent among those seeking partner investors for
their activities in the region. They hope to ﬁnd a West European or
US ﬁrm to provide the capital that they ﬁnd difﬁcult to raise, while
they in return contribute know-how and the experience of
operating in the region. Many companies in the Balkans could
beneﬁt from such joint ventures, offering their local knowledge in
exchange for capital. 
To facilitate such joint ventures, chambers of commerce could
organise meetings, bringing companies together to swap ideas and
establish the personal relationships that are so important to strong
business ties. At present, meetings between national chambers of
commerce tend to be conducted on a bilateral basis. Sector-speciﬁc
meetings would have the advantage of bringing together companies
with similar interests from around the Balkans, as well as foreign
investors. The institutional structures already exist, and the chambers
could take it in turns to run the events for different sectors.
A Balkan Development Bank
Another ﬁnancing option for local business would be the formation
of a Balkan Development Bank, with a mandate to fund cross-
border projects. This regional development bank could be set up
along the lines of the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank.11
That bank was set up in 1998, in an effort to overcome the problem
of ﬁnancing investments in countries with high political risk.
Around 60 per cent of its lending is directed towards investments
and 40 per cent to trade ﬁnancing. Projects must beneﬁt more than
one country, but not necessarily incorporate the whole region.
The Black Sea Trade and Development Bank’s ﬁrst project in
December 1999 was to grant a loan of $12 million to help Ukraine
build a gas compressor station to feed the trans-Balkan gas pipeline.
The compressor increased the capacity of the pipeline, boosting transit
revenues for the countries through which it passes – Russia, Ukraine,
Moldova, Romania, Bulgaria and Turkey. The bank was not the sole
lender in this deal, which cost a total of $78 million. Indeed, it can
ﬁnance only 35 per cent of any one project, or up to 100 per cent for
trade ﬁnancing. However, its involvement and intimate knowledge of
the region often helps to attract other creditors and investors who
would otherwise be deterred by the risk of doing business in this
region. Moreover, the bank is a home-grown initiative set up by the
countries themselves to serve the needs that they know best. 
The main restriction on the Black Sea Trade and Development Bank’s
activities is the fairly low level of capital at its disposal, currently
around $1.4 billion. Member countries, many of which are relatively
impoverished, have donated the Bank’s capital in proportion to their
ability to pay. Greece, Russia and Turkey has each contributed 16.5
per cent of the total capital; Bulgaria, Romania and Ukraine 13.5 per
cent; and the remaining countries 2 per cent each. A Balkan
Development Bank would similarly need to include wealthy members
– perhaps the current major investors in the region, namely Greece,
Turkey, Austria and Italy. A Balkan Development Bank would
identify its own investment projects, giving the countries themselves
far more input into the way that international money is spent in the
region. To ensure that a proposal had broad credibility, the bank
could demand that it attract matching funding from the European
Bank of Reconstruction and Development and other such
organisations. A Balkan Development Bank could help ﬁnance intra-
regional trade. And it would provide cheaper ﬁnancing to locals who
have good ideas for regional investment projects.
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IV Seamless infrastructure
Smooth business transactions across borders depend on seamless
services: in transport, energy, telecoms and banking. Balkan
governments know they must overhaul these basic services, which
currently tend to be inefﬁcient and unreliable and thus present
serious barriers to investment and cross-border business activity. But
they have yet to realise that a regional approach to infrastructure
could bring signiﬁcant economies of scale and efﬁciency gains. Co-
operation would also mean harmonising standards and enhancing
technical compatibility – factors which could prove essential to
achieving healthy competition among providers in the region in
future, as well as preparing the way for EU integration. 
However, most of these industries are still, at least partially, in state
ownership. Privatisation is a priority. Indeed, co-operation among
regional ﬁrms is likely to be achieved faster if it is left to their new
owners – as the banking sector shows. Governments should take the
regional dimension into account when preparing companies for
privatisation, by making an effort to harmonise standards and ensure
technical compatibility. A regional perspective would make the assets
more attractive to foreign investors, helping the state to secure a good
price and a long-term commitment from the new owners.
Banking – a regional approach
Foreign investors are already pursuing a regional strategy in the
banking sector, with Austrian, Italian and Greek banks battling for
inﬂuence. South-Eastern Europe is a more attractive banking
market than it might seem at ﬁrst glance. Much of the population
has hoarded foreign-currency savings under their mattresses during
recent years of instability, because they distrust local banks. It is
also common for people to receive remittances from friends and
The establishment of a Balkan Development Bank would, of course,
require at least a minimum of collective political will. But the
inclusion of members such as Italy and Austria might help to
convince Croatia, for example, that participation would not
stigmatise it as part of an underdeveloped region. Small
entrepreneurs, who would have much to gain from the
establishment of the bank, could be expected to lobby their
governments to support the initiative. And the key strength of such
an institution – for a region anxious to avoid aid dependence –
would be that it was built on the initiative of the countries
themselves, rather than that of external donors.
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The upcoming privatisation of Yugoslav banks will boost interest in
the region’s banking sector, since most will be sold directly to foreign
investors. In summer 2001, a delegation of Yugoslav bankers visited
Zagreb to meet Croatian bankers, in an attempt to encourage them to
start lending in Serbia. The deputy CEO of Belgrade’s Yugobanka,
Dragan Pavlovi´c, says that Croatian bankers, with their capital and
know-how, could earn “superproﬁts” if they entered the Serbian
market. Slovenia’s largest bank, Nova Ljubljanska Banka, is clearly
convinced. It recently announced that it would be buying a majority
stake in Yugoslavia’s Continental Banka.
The rush into Balkan banking is good news for foreign investors
generally, who will beneﬁt from much-needed innovations in the
ﬁnancial sector. More foreign ownership and competition will
ultimately bring better access to trade ﬁnancing, cheaper loans for
investment and more secure conditions for consumers. It also sends a
signal: if banks see advantages in entering the region quickly, and in
maximising their presence in several countries, they prepare the way
for their clients to follow.
Telecoms – time to connect
A decade ago, telecom companies throughout the Balkans were
state-owned national monopolies. Now foreign investors, with a
clear interest in pursuing a regional-based strategy, own a
significant proportion of the Balkans’ telecoms businesses.
Greece’s state-controlled telecoms ﬁrm OTE is the most high-
proﬁle investor. It owns ﬁxed-line and mobile operators in
Romania, a GSM licence in Bulgaria, a mobile operator in Albania
and a stake – with Telecom Italia – in the Serbian ﬁxed-line
monopoly. In early 2001, it failed to win the tender for
Macedonia’s ﬁxed-line monopoly, beaten by a new regional
player, Hungary’s Matáv. The owner of Matáv, Deutsche Telekom,
in turn owns Hrvatski Telekom, Croatia’s ﬁxed-line provider. 
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relatives working or living abroad. In addition, public ﬁnance
problems throughout the region mean that most governments are
implementing pensions reform, providing opportunities for banks
to create private pension funds. When German insurance giant
Allianz set up a fund in Bulgaria in 2000, it attracted 230,000
customers in its ﬁrst year.
Allianz has teamed up with UniCredito, an Italian bank with a
strong presence in Central Europe, to pursue its regional strategy.
The two companies are hoping to expand their Balkan presence by
acquiring Croatia’s top bank, Zagrebac˘ka Banka. Zagrebac˘ka is a
natural platform for regional expansion, having already made
important acquisitions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, where it is now the
market leader. Brand recognition and a good reputation helped it in
Bosnia, and should also be of beneﬁt in the other former Yugoslav
markets it is now targeting. For Franjo Lukovic´, chairman of
Zagrebac˘ka Banka, the potential of South-Eastern Europe as a
whole is obvious. “We believe some kind of customs union or
common market will develop in the next few years, as stability
increases”, he says. “This is an opportunity for Zagrebac˘ka Banka
to get in early and gain a leading position.” Lukovic´ is conﬁdent
that economic ties among the former Yugoslav republics will grow
quickly, enabling a regional bank to service regional clients. 
The UniCredito-Allianz-Zagrebac˘ka Banka team has strong
competitors, especially among the Austrian banks. Raiffeisen has been
quick off the mark in the Balkans, entering Croatia in late 1994 while
war still rumbled on. Raiffeisen also recently bought banks in Bosnia
and Romania, and in 2001 became the ﬁrst foreign bank to set up
shop in Yugoslavia.12 Its aim is to service clients who conduct their
business on a regional basis. Two other Austrian banks, Erste and
Bank Austria are also present in the Balkans market, while Greek and
Turkish banks, such as National Bank of Greece, Alpha Bank and
Kent Bank dominate in Macedonia, Bulgaria, Romania and Albania.
German, Italian and Greek telecom giants already dominate the
Balkan ﬁxed-line telecoms market, with only the Bulgarian
Telecommunications Company and Albtelecom left to be
privatised. But the mobile market is still open. The UK’s Vodafone
and Orange are OTE’s main competitors while Austria’s Mobilkom
is looking for new opportunities following its success with VIPnet
in Croatia. The potential is huge: Slovenia, for example, has one of
the highest levels of mobile penetration in Europe, at well over 60
per cent of the population. In neighbouring Croatia, only 23 per
cent of the population owns a mobile, while the penetration rate in
Bulgaria is just 10 per cent.
The new regional players can now start exploiting their intra-
regional connections. One possible strategy would be to offer
cheap-rate international calls within South-Eastern Europe, or at
least between all the companies in which they have stakes in the
region. Contacts between business people across borders will drive
demand; while family connections, particularly in the former
Yugoslav countries, also create demand for cheap phone calls
within the region.
Electricity – out of balance
Different patterns of supply and demand create considerable scope
for regional co-operation in the electricity sector. Romania and
Bulgaria are capable of producing signiﬁcant electricity surpluses,
while Yugoslavia, Croatia and, most importantly, Turkey, need to
import electricity. Greece, unlike the rest of the region, experiences
peak demand for electricity in the summer, owing to tourists’ high
usage of air conditioning. Albania, on the other hand, relies on
hydropower generators and hence has excess supply in the rainy
months but shortages at other times. Such imbalances represent
excellent opportunities to trade electricity within the region. 
However, most electricity companies in the Balkans still face
problems in efﬁciently supplying their domestic markets. Most are
still in state ownership, are seriously under-funded and face
uneconomic pricing regimes. They often have unhealthy
relationships with other large state-owned ﬁrms, where non-
payment is overlooked or electricity is provided at cheaper rates.
Governments sometimes ﬁnd their efforts to liberalise and privatise
the companies blocked by powerful labour unions.
Aside from inefﬁcient companies, technical and legal problems
make regional co-operation virtually impossible:
★Weak or absent transmission links. Those countries that can
produce electricity surpluses do not necessarily have the
transmission links to export them. In early 2001, for example,
the EU provided ﬁnancing to Serbia and Kosovo to import
electricity from Bulgaria and Romania. But Romania’s physical
network was so poor that exporting large amounts would have
created risks for the internal Romanian network. In some parts
of the region, transmission links simply do not exist.
Transmission links between Serbia, Croatia, Bosnia and
Slovenia, once part of the same country, have been disrupted
since junctions in eastern Croatia and southern Bosnia were
damaged during the 1991-95 wars. These facilities need
substantial investment before Bosnia and countries further east
can be reconnected to the European transmission network.
★ Lack of regional standards. Most of the former Yugoslav
republics are part of the European transmission network,
along with Greece. Bulgaria, Romania, Albania and Turkey are
not. That means that electricity companies in the region are
not working on common standards. Several projects are in
progress to connect the eastern Balkans to the network. But
even when the technical problems are solved, there needs to be
a broader strategy of linking national regulators, to ensure that
regulation promotes compatibility and common standards. 
★ Weak trading mentality. Managers at Balkan electricity
companies have little understanding of the potential and
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Transport – exploiting location
The Balkans has a key competitive advantage – its location. It is
home to six of the pan-European transport corridors that have been
speciﬁcally designated as such by the EU, linking northern and
Western Europe to the Middle East, Central Asia, Russia and
Ukraine. But few people use these corridors. The region’s many
conﬂicts, exacerbated by terrible road and rail infrastructure, have
meant that these routes are seldom fast or safe. 
Donors are aware of the importance of transport for economic
growth. At the Second Regional Conference for South-East Europe,
held in Bucharest in October 2001, the EU, World Bank and
Stability Pact reiterated their commitment to improving transport
infrastructure. The donors earmarked S2.4 billion for infrastructure
projects, much of which will go to improving transport links.
Although various international organisations already pay
considerable attention to transport infrastructure in the Balkans,
donors would be advised to focus on the following areas:
★ Prioritise intra-regional transport. Balkan governments do not
always see an interest in building roads to countries within the
region, preferring to give priority to links with the EU.
Negotiations between Bulgaria and Romania over the location
of a second bridge over the Danube to connect the two
countries were stalled for years, partly because of a lack of
interest in regional co-operation. Intra-regional road routes
should be given priority in the short term.
★ Find a more innovative and accessible approach to ﬁnancing.
It is difﬁcult for companies in the region to win construction
contracts because of their poor access to government guarantees
and loans. Western companies also need encouragement to build
in a region perceived as politically risky. To encourage investors
to take on ‘build-operate-transfer’ contracts (whereby a ﬁrm
agrees to invest in a road if it is subsequently able to collect tolls
for a certain period), the EU could guarantee to make up the
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beneﬁts of regional trading. They are often keen to sell but not
interested in buying. Only training and exposure to efﬁcient
trading systems elsewhere will change this mentality. 
★ Financing difﬁculties. Energy projects are expensive and tend
to bring gains only in the long term, which makes ﬁnancing in
the risky Balkan environment extremely difﬁcult. Most
projects to date have been supported by international ﬁnancial
institutions, like the World Bank, the European Investment
Bank and the European Bank for Reconstruction and
Development. Commercial investors often require state
guarantees. The Turkish and Bulgarian governments are
particularly constrained, because they are unable to extend
guarantees to private companies.
The two key factors to overcoming these barriers in the short term
are privatisation and liberalisation. All of the state electricity
companies in the region are set to be privatised over the next ﬁve
years. The common model is for the monopolies to be unbundled
into three parts: generation, transmission and distribution, with
power stations due to be sold ﬁrst. Government reluctance to
privatise transmission and distribution facilities is likely to be
tempered by bugetory pressures, and encouragement from
international organisations.
The EU sees energy liberalisation as a pre-condition to membership.
Energy liberalisation is also crucial to boosting competition in the
regional electricity market and increasing opportunities for trade.
Slovenia, which liberalised its internal electricity market in 2001 and
will open its external market in 2003, might be able to share its
experiences with the rest of the region. Its market operator, Borzen,
could in the long term service the whole region. Bulgaria is also
making progress, with the ﬁrst stage of liberalisation now underway.
Slovenia’s Adria Airways and Hungary’s Malév). Three working
groups have been established:
★Commercial Adria Airways is moderating this group, which
is charged with investigating the potential for co-operation
on business strategies, marketing and sales.
★ Technical Malév is co-ordinating a discussion of areas in
which the airlines could harmonise technical standards
and share expertise.
★ Training JAT is leading a debate on proposals for sharing
training facilities and ensuring that airline personnel use
compatible procedures. JAT has a large training centre for
ﬂight and commercial personnel, which is IATA approved.
JAT has already concluded co-operation agreements with Air Bosnia,
Air Srpska, and the Macedonian and Montenegrin airlines. It hopes to
gain similar deals with Malév and Tarom (Romania). Croatia Airlines,
though, has expressed reluctance to co-operate closely, partly reﬂecting
historical grievances over the routing of ﬂights to the Dalmatian coast. 
Preoccupation with such concerns misses the point. The establishment
of new alliances in the region would not remove Croatia Airlines’
control over its own ﬂight schedules. It would, however, give the
company opportunities to operate more efﬁciently, which could help it
to offer more services and stay proﬁtable. Trends in the global airline
industry, with more and more national carriers joining international
alliances and operating code-sharing agreements, reinforce the
importance of such co-operation. 
Slovenia’s Adria Airways appears ready to move in this direction. It
is taking part in the JAT initiative and is actively seeking a strategic
investor to boost its capital, aware that its own growth depends on
collaboration. Adria was one of the ﬁrst airlines to introduce ﬂights
to Belgrade and Podgorica after the fall of former Yugoslav
difference if toll revenues fail to meet projections. Tenders for
aid-ﬁnanced projects should, where possible, be open to all
countries in the region. Efforts should be made to train local
companies in the techniques of bidding and participating in a
tender – skills which many local ﬁrms lack. 
★ Encourage governments to co-operate on transport planning
when drawing up their national programmes. Investors seeking to
win road-building contracts may be faced with competing
national visions if, say, confronted on how a motorway should be
built and what services it should offer. Greater standardisation
would help to attract investors as well as improving maintenance
standards on the roads once they are complete.
★ Give priority to maintenance and upgrades of existing facilities,
rather than focus solely on new construction projects. There are
plenty of roads in the Balkans. The problem is quality:
motorways are a rarity; the existing roads are not built to take
heavy European trucks; and maintenance is poor. With
railways, the situation is even worse. Over 90 per cent of
railways in the region are single track and less than 40 per cent
are electriﬁed. Maintenance standards are also poor. In
Yugoslavia, the average speed on the network is now below 60
kilometres per hour and only 20 per cent of rolling stock is
operational.
Air connections within the region itself, vital for business travellers,
are poor. There are no scheduled ﬂights at all on some routes
between Balkan capitals. Vienna currently serves as a hub for the
region, but this makes for long, indirect journeys. Most of the
national air carriers are struggling – some face bankruptcy and
others survive only with substantial state support. 
These problems have prompted the airlines to focus on greater co-
operation. At the end of 2000, JAT (Yugoslav Airlines) initiated
discussions on an alliance with several other Balkan carriers (plus
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President Slobodan Milos˘evic´ in October 2000. The company
already has code-share agreements with Germany’s Lufthansa, Air
France, Croatia Airlines and Israel’s El Al. These alliances improve
Slovenia’s ability to service both tourists and business travellers.
More regional carriers should follow Adria’s lead for closer co-
operation, paving the way for full-scale mergers in the future. 
V Conclusion and recommendations
Regional co-operation is crucial to economic development in the
Balkans. The ability of individual countries in the region to attract
foreign investment depends to a great extent on their being perceived
as part of a larger region – and functioning as such. Taken together,
the Balkans represents a market of around 55 million people, rising
to 130 million if Greece and Turkey are included. Similarly, local
ﬁrms stand a far better chance of attracting ﬁnancing or investment
if they can trade across borders or exploit efﬁciencies gained by co-
operating with neighbours. Those who have already invested in the
region are generally based in one country while operating in several.
But many other potential investors have walked away because the
region does not yet function as a single market. 
In order to foster these emerging regional business networks, the
infrastructure and services upon which they rely also need to
become more integrated. A Balkan energy market could identify
variations in supply and demand to ensure more reliable provision
of electricity. Foreign investors in telecoms could develop products
to suit the needs of cross-border businesses, as the banking sector is
already doing. Transport companies could work together to achieve
lower costs while providing a seamless service across borders.
A welcome side-effect of this business co-operation is a ﬁrmer
foundation for political stability. The development of relationships
across borders gives business-people – both foreign and local – an
interest in the security of the region. This helps to counterbalance
the interest that many powerful players in the black economy
currently have in instability and conﬂict. Economic interdependence
also fosters better political relations among Balkan governments.
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to discuss issues of common concern. However, neither institution
has the resources or policy instruments to implement what
decisions taken at its meetings. Hence the success of their efforts
relies ultimately on the political will of national leaders. And few
politicians expect to gain any domestic political capital by
promoting co-operation in the Balkans.
Regional leaders, therefore, lack political incentives to foster links
with neighbouring countries. Business people, however, focus on
the concrete economic beneﬁts of regional co-operation, and are
more natural enthusiasts for integration. Where there is a strong
business interest in co-operation, the emotional issues become less
important. And that makes life easier for politicians. When the
Yugoslav and Croatian chambers of commerce lobby for a bilateral
free-trade agreement, for example, their governments ﬁnd it easier
to tell voters that a normalisation of political relations is in the
national interest. Business people are more likely to see that co-
operation offers opportunities, and are more likely to overcome the
prejudices which pervade the region. A businessman will, after all,
only pursue a venture if it offers clear economic beneﬁts – his
decision does not depend on any special kinship or brotherly love. 
Business people in the Balkans are also a great source of expertise.
They have continued to operate in the difﬁcult economic and
political conditions of recent years. They should now be mobilised
into effective (and transparent) lobby groups, to shape and give
feedback on policies affecting their operations. Foreign investors,
too, would welcome channels through which to communicate their
needs and frustrations.
Sceptics rightly note that regional co-operation has been lauded as
an ideal and promoted as a policy for years, while advances in this
direction have been few. The concept has been advocated mainly by
the EU, which at one stage made it a pre-condition of progress
towards membership for the Western Balkan countries (Albania,
Bosnia, Croatia, Macedonia and Yugoslavia). This linkage proved
unhelpful. Leaders in the region were appalled at the prospect that
their own chances of joining the EU might depend on the behaviour
of their neighbours – countries they often regarded as backward,
unreliable and aggressive. Croatia, for example, currently enjoys a
per capita GDP nearly four times higher than Albania or
Yugoslavia. Given the vast disparities among Balkan countries, the
more advanced and stable states feared that their own accession to
the EU would be sacriﬁced for the sake of weaker neighbours.
Regional co-operation was thus seen as a threat, a measure
designed to exclude Balkan countries from the bounties of
European integration. 
The EU has now altered its stance. The Stabilisation and
Association Process introduced in 1999 provides a common
framework for integration, but relations with the EU are conducted
solely on a bilateral basis. States follow their own road-maps, work
at their own speed and are assessed on their own merits. The new
procedures have successfully re-invigorated Balkan enthusiasm for
European integration. A less positive consequence is that the EU is
now reluctant to promote multilateral contacts within the region.
Other institutions and associations have also promoted regional co-
operation, with perhaps greater degrees of success. The Stability
Pact for South-East Europe has brought together policy-makers
from regional and western governments, and international
organisations, with the purpose of achieving co-ordinated policies
on political, economic and security issues. Another worthwhile
initiative has come directly from the region itself – the South-East
Europe Co-operation Process, launched in 2000. This regularly
brings together heads of state and parliamentarians from the region
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In sum, this paper would support the following recommendations:
★Governments in the region should accelerate the negotiation of
bilateral free-trade agreements and seek to improve their readiness
for accession to CEFTA. The EU should exert pressure on CEFTA
to open up to South-East European countries.
★ Governments in the region should seek to improve customs
services at borders in line with the World Bank’s Trade and
Transport Facilitation Programme. International donors
should make the implementation of such projects a priority.
★ Business associations and chambers of commerce should
educate their members about current border regulations and
upcoming changes. They should conduct surveys of their
members in order to establish a clear picture of the experiences
and complaints faced by business people in using borders.
They should also channel this information to governments to
help them to revise policies.
★ Foreign investment agencies should co-operate to launch a
Balkan-wide investment promotion programme, sharing
information and providing joint assistance to foreign investors. 
★The EU should provide ﬁnancial assistance to cover the costs
of such a campaign. Successful foreign investors in the region
could sponsor the campaign, share experiences and help to
identify opportunities.
★Pairs or trios of Balkan governments should consider offering
joint incentive programmes to attract foreign investment in
cross-border projects to their countries.
★ Chambers of commerce and business associations in the region
should co-operate to host sector-speciﬁc meetings to bring
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together companies with similar interests from around the
region and abroad. This should facilitate the formation of joint
ventures and intensify contact with potential foreign investors.
★National governments should set up a regional development
bank, to improve access to ﬁnancing for local businesses with
cross-border ambitions.
★ In key infrastructure sectors that remain in state hands,
governments that are restructuring companies should take into
account the beneﬁts of regional co-operation when preparing
them for privatisation.
★ Balkan governments should accelerate liberalisation and
privatisation programmes in these key sectors, to open the way
for foreign buyers to exploit regional opportunities.
★National regulators of energy and telecoms sectors should share
information and seek to harmonise standards across the region.
★ International donors should give greater priority to supporting
intra-regional transport infrastructure.
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